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Abstract 
This article presents the most relevant facts that charac-
terised the evolution of the Brazilian economy before, during and 
after the currency crisis of the beginning of 1999. It presents the 
aggravating macroeconomic unbalances that developed until 
1998, the crisis chronology, and tries to identify the reasons why 
the Brazilian economy reacted with relative success to the devalu-
ation of its currency. The article wraps up with a cautiously 
optimistic evaluation of the perspectives of the Brazilian economy 
in its new policy regime. 
Resumo 
Este artigo apresenta a evolução dos fatos mais importan-
tes que caracterizaram a evolução da economia brasileira antes, 
durante e depois da crise cambial do início de 1999. Mostra-se o 
agravamento dos desequilíbrios macroeconômicos até 1998; ex-
põe-se a cronologia da crise; e procuram-se identificar as razões 
pelas quais a economia brasileira reagiu com relativo sucesso à 
desvalorização. O artigo conclui com uma avaliação cautelosa-
mente otimista acerca das perspectivas da economia brasileira 
no novo regime econômico. 
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1. Introduction 
In December 1994, Medo:, devalued its currency in more 
than 50% and the consequences were disastrous, at least in the 
following year. Inflation reached over 50%, GDP dropped around 
5% and the country plunged into a financial crisis. When South 
Korea was brought to take similar action, in 1997, inflation 
behaved much better - it stayed below 10% -, but GDP suffered 
a contraction similar to the Mexican case. The financial crisis also 
reached drastic proportions, leaving behind the need to promote 
a financial restructuring not yet completed. Contrasting with 
these experiences, in 1999, when it got to Brazil's turn to devaJu-
ate the Real (R$), inflation followed a path similar to Korea's, GDP 
experienced a modest growth, and nothing dose to a financial 
crisis occurred. 
What happened in Brazil was not positively absorbed by 
the population in a first moment due to the fact that this process 
was conducted by the recently elected President and by his 
Finance Minister who, in the previous years, had been among the 
greatest supporters of currency stability. By drastically changing 
the exchange rate, Government's popularity dropped in the oppo-
site proportion of the dollar appreciation, which is understand-
able, given the emblematic character that the exchange rate 
predictability had assumed in the past. Nevertheless, based on 
what was said and comparing the Brazilian situation with that of 
the other countries that abandoned their more or less rigid 
exchange rate regimes between 1994 - when, with the "tequila 
effect", the "first financial crisis of the XXI century took place", 
according to M. Camdessus - and 1999, Brazil promoted the most 
successful change in exchange rate regime among ali emerging 
countries, with a substantial real devaluation and a relatively 
modest cost in terms of level of activity and inflation. 
How did this process happen? What characterised the 
deterioration of Brazil's economic situation throughout the first 
term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso? How did the 
country overcome the crisis in 1999? What can be expected in the 
new situation? These and other related issues will be covered in 
this paper. 
The article is divided in seven sections, including this brief 
introduction. Next, it describes the arguments of the supporters 
of the fixed exchange rate strategy during the 1997-1998 crisis. 
The main idea was that Brazil was a different case and, therefore, 
could sustain its exchange rate policy. Then a chronology of the 
Brazilian crisis is presented, from the 1997 Asian crisis until the 
eruption of the currency crisis in January 1999. The fourth 
section explains what happened throughout 1999-2000. After 
that, two sections constitute the analytical core of this work: one, 
calling the attention to the regime change of Brazil's economic 
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policy from 1999 on, under the "umbrella" of the agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stressing that the greatest 
test of the new regime will happen in 2002, when the accord 
expires; and the other, trying to explain why Brazil did not have 
a financial crisis. Finally, the concluding comments of the text 
are presented. 
2. Why Brazil Was Not Thailand (or Was It?) 
Even though the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 is still a recent 
phenomenon and, therefore, might generate exhaustive academic 
reflections, the majority of the analysis done on the episodes that 
successively shook the economies of Thailand, South Korea, 
Indonesia and Malaysia coincide in pointing out the fragility of 
the financial system as one of the most important explanatory 
factors of the crisis. To that was associated, in turn, the previous 
boom, which could be considered the origin of an "overlending 
crisis". 
Notwithstanding the particularities of each country, the 
common denominator of these processes, in general terms, was 
the combination of: 
a) an investment boom fuelled by the increasing indebted-
ness of families, firms and countries; 
b) banks high leverage; 
c) lack of appropriate bank supervision; 
d) mounting short-term externai obligations of firms and 
banks; and 
e) fixed, or relatively fixed, exchange rates in a context of 
increasing current account deficits. 
In such circumstances, as stated by a local analyst regard-
ing South Korea's case, but whose observation could apply to the 
other countries involved, the crisis was the combination of "a 
currency crisis and a financial crisis" (Shin and Hahm [1998 
p. 1)). 
Two numbers illustrate the dimension of the problem: a) 
according to the BIS, in June 1997, the banking system externai 
debt as a percentage of international reserves was 216% in Korea, 
157% in Indonesia and 141% in Thailand (Idea [1998)); 1 b) credit 
to the private sector, in 1996, had reached 170% of GDP in Korea, 
1 For comparative grounds, based on the same table, this proportion in Brazil was 78%. 
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130% in Thailand, 120% in Malaysia and 80% in Indonesia (Idea 
[1998]). The success of these economies in such circumstances 
depended on a "non-stopping engine", with growth generating 
revenue flows that would allow for new investment leverage and 
so on. On the other hand, the stagnation of the economy could 
have major negative effects on the payment capability of the 
different economic agents, generating a series of bankruptcies in 
a typical case of "domino-effect", where the failure of payment of 
one agent impedes its Tender to pay its own debts to third parties. 
This situation stands only a step away from a financial crisis. 
The deterioration of the Asian countries terms of trade, 
caused by the price decrease of some of the most important goods 
that led the growth of the previous years, is understood by some 
analysts as the criticai point of the crisis. Exchange rate rigidity, 
combined with the short maturity of the debt, were the two 
ingredients to generate a serious crisis: with a relatively fixed 
currency and the difficulties to sustain it, the temptation to buy 
foreign currency due to the upcoming (and predictable) crisis was 
very high. What happened then was a succession of "self-fulfilling 
prophecy" cases. 
When Thailand, in 1997, triggered the series of crises that 
marked Asia in that year, Brazilian authorities made an effort to 
distinguish the Brazilian case from that of the Asian countries 
who, one after another, started to show the same crisis symptoms 
that Thailand had experienced. A similar effort had been done -
with significant success - in 1995 to show that "Brazil was not 
Mexico". 
What were the main arguments in pro of the distinct nature 
of the Brazilian case? Shortly, it was argued that: 
i) Thailand's current account deficit in 1996, coinciden-
tally, was basically the same as Mexico's in 1994 - about 8% of 
GDP - and more than twice, as a percentage of GDP, than Brazil's 
at that time; 
ii) opposite to what happened in those countries and the 
other countries in Asia, Brazil was initiating a process of gradual 
real devaluation of its exchange rate, keeping nominal devalu-
ation around 7% to 8% p.a., in a context of declining inflation 
(around 2% to 3% p.a.); 
iii) in the 1997-1999 period, Brazil counted on the pers-
pective of receiving an expressive amount of externai resources 
from the privatisation of State companies: in May 1997, Bacha 
and Welch [1997] estimated that the privatisation potential was 
US$ 56 billions for the 1997-1999 period. If two thirds of these 
resources originated from overseas - which was a realistic pers-
pective -, it would represent an annual flow of US$ 12 billions, 
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enough to finance, per se, more than a third of the current 
account deficit expected for 1997: over US$ 30 billions; 
iv) despite the privatisation process, direct investment was 
sharply increasing in Brazil: excluding the privatisation inilows 
but including the portfolio resources, the net entrance of direct 
investment reached US$ 5 billions in 1995, US$ 13 billions in 
1996, and US$ 16 billions in 1997; it seemed reasonable, there-
fore, to imagine that the sum of "pure" direct investment plus 
privatisation would suffice to finance a substantial part of the 
current account deficit of the following years, while the country 
"saved time" to promote a gradual real devaluation of its currency 
and stimulate exports through non-exchange rate mechanisms, 
in a context of unrestricted international finance; 
v) Brazil had a perspective of a continuing economic policy, 
with no sight of immediate change of authorities, with the Presi-
dent leading the polis to the 1998 elections running for re-elec-
tion, and without fractures in the economic staff, leading no space 
for suspicion regarding the conduction of future economic policy 
that emerged, due to the local political circumstances of the time, 
in Thailand and South Korea; and, last but not least, 
vi) the credit expansion indicators in Brazil differed subs-
tantially from those shown by Asia, with a total amount of credit 
provided by the public and private financial systems of only 30% 
of GDP, in clear contrast with the numbers previously shown for 
the East Asian countries (Graph 1). 
Analysing the arguments retrospectively, it cannot be said 
that they were wrong. In fact, the Brazilian externai deficit did not 
reach the same relative dimension of other countries; the real 
exchange rate suffered a devaluation of 7% to 8% in 1998; 
privatisation was very expressive in 1997 and 1998; externai 
investment kept increasing; the President was re-elected and the 
Graph 1 
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Finance Minister stayed on the job; and domestic credit remained 
limited. 
Why, then, contrary to what the Government used to say, 
it got to Brazil's turn to devaluate its currency? What went wrong? 
There were two fundamental factors that explained this change. 
The first was the adverse shock of relative prices: between the 
months ofJanuary 1997 and 1999 - when devaluation took place 
-, the price index of primary and semi-manufacturing goods 
exported by Brazil fell 15% and 17%, respectively. The second was 
the closure of the international markets for credit, after the 
Russian crisis, in August 1998. The Brazilian strategy assumed 
that the country would have time to make the necessary adjust-
ments, while the rest of the world financed a temporarily elevated 
deficit in the current account. However, the price shock aggra-
vated this unbalance. The Russian crisis, in turn, meant that the 
time was up. 2 
3. Chronology of the Crisis 3 
Since the Asian crisis of 1997, it became clear to everyone, 
including the Government, that Brazil had to change its economic 
policy, resolving its two main unbalances that deeply worsened 
in the 1995/1997 period: the budget and current account deficits. 
The first represented the systematic deterioration of the primary 
results - i.e., excluding interest - of the consolidated public sector, 
generating an increase in public debt (Table 1); and the second 
the increase - also systematic - of the ratio current account 
deficit/GDP (Table 2). The solution for this required a combina-
tion of expenditure cuts and revenue increase, on one hand, and 
the increase in competitiveness of the Brazilian products - funda-
mentally, associated to a better real exchange rate -, on the other. 
The chosen path was gradualism. When data from 1998 
and 1997 is compared, it can be noted an improvement of the 
primary fiscal result, with a real devaluation of the Real. The 
adjustments, however, were way short of what should have been 
required in light of the effective circumstances that took place, 
2 It is worth registering that these two effects also hit Argentina, which, nevertheless, succeeded in 
maintaining the parity of its currency. There are a few reasons, however, to explain this difference. 
First, the Argentine fiscal indicators in 1997 and 1998 were substantially better than Brazil's, 
generating a better "good-will" of the market with regards to the country's situation. Second, there 
was the perception that the country would hesitate much more to devaluate, what practically 
eliminated the possibility that it would be an option for the Government and decreased the 
speculative demand for reserves, associated to the fear that the Government would change its mind. 
Third, Argentina maintained the parity but suffered a 3% contraction of GDP in 1999, in contrast 
with the small positive growth in Brazil. And fourth, the strategy of extending the externai debt 
sought in the previous years by the Argentine authorities proved efficient, generating a relative need 
for amortisation payments smaller than in Brazil in 1998 and 1999. 
3 For more about the points of this section see Giambiagi [1998] and Franco [1999a]. 
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Table 1 
Public Sector Net Debt (GDP %) 
Composition 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Domestic Debt 17,6 21,8 27,0 26,7 31,8 32,7 
Central Government 3,0 6,6 12,0 13,3 16,8 16.8 
Bonds 11,6 15,5 21,4 28,3 35.5 37,7 
Assets -8,6 -8,9 -9,4 -15,0 -18,7 -20,9 
States and Municipalities 9,5 10,3 11,1 12,5 13,7 14,7 
State Companies 5,1 4,9 3,9 0.9 1,3 1,2 
External Debt 8,4 5,5 3,9 4,3 6,3 9,9 
Central Government 6,2 3,5 1,6 1,9 4,3 7,d 
States and Municipalities 0,3 0,3 0,4 0.5 0.7 0.9 
State Companies 1,9 1,7 1,9 1,9 1.3 1.4 
Total Debt /a 26,0 27,3 30.9 31.0 38,1 42,6 
Central Government 9,2 10,1 13,6 15,2 21,1 24,4 
States and Municipalities 9.8 10,6 11,5 13,0 14.4 15,6 
State Companies 7,0 6,6 5,8 2,8 2,6 2,6 
n. a. = not availabie. 
/a Excluding monetary basis. 
Source: Central Bank. 
Table 2 
Brazil - Trade Balance and Foreign Direct Investiment - US$ billion 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000/a 
1- Trade Balance 10752 10579 15239 13117 10843 -3353 -5556 -8365 -6591 -1198 2000 
Exporta 31414 31620 35793 38597 43544 46506 47747 52989 51140 48011 55000 
Imports 20661 21041 20554 25480 32701 49859 53303 61354 57731 49209 53000 
2- Services -15369 -13542 -11539 -15215 -14743 -18600 -21044 -27289 -28799 -25211 -29500 
2.1- Interest -9748 -8621 -7253 -8280 -6337 -8158 -9173 -10390 -11948 -15170 -15500 
2.2- Profits and Remittances -1865 -1030 -949 -1931 -2566 -2790 -2821 -5749 -7305 -4058 -6000 
2.3- Other Services -3756 -3891 -3337 -5004 -5839 -7652 -9050 -11150 -9546 -5983 -8000 
2.3.1- Travel -121 -211 -319 -799 -1181 -2420 -3594 -4377 -4146 -1436 -2000 
2.3.2- Transporta -1644 -1656 -1359 -1700 -2441 -3200 -3480 -4514 -3259 -2802 -3500 
2.3.3- Insurance -68 -133 -58 -65 -132 -122 -64 74 81 -127 O 
2.3.4- Government -328 -370 -166 -345 -327 -339 -275 -350 -385 -494 -500 
2.3.5- Other -1595 -1521 -1436 -2095 -1759 -1572 -1637 -1983 -1837 -1124 -2000 
3- Unilateral Transfers 834 1556 2243 1653 2588 3974 2899 2216 1778 2035 2000 
Current Account -3782 -1407 5943 -444 -1312 -17979 -23701 -33438 -33612 -24374 -25500 
Memo: Net FDI /b 169 -43 1443 -380 934 2569 9966 15516 22619 28608 25000 
/a Author's forecast. 
/b Excluding portfolio. 
Source: Central Bank. 
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especially in the second half of 1998. Using an often cited 
metaphor, it can be said that Brazil changed the route of the 
Titanic, but this change, being slow and delayed, was not enough 
to avoid the "ship" to collide with the iceberg - in this case, the 
externai crisis. Why gradualism was chosen as opposed to a shock 
strategy is an open question, but whose answer certainly involves 
the combination of three elements: i) a certain amount of confi-
dence by the authorities on the reversion of the Asian crisis 
effects, similar to what happened in 1995 after the Mexican crisis, 
promptly forgotten by the international market; the fear of a 
débacle that an eventual more intense devaluation could cause 
in the stabilisation plan - the Mexican case in 1995, when 
inflation reached 50% in that country, partially supported this 
concern; and iii) the realisation of general elections in October 
1998: no Government, anywhere in the world, likes to implement 
a shock treatment in an electoral year. 
The evolution of facts in the first half of 1998 seemed to 
support the official optimism. The country risk indicators, after 
the October 1997 jump, improved substantially. The reserves 
were recovering, and, in this context, interest rates, which had 
reached almost 40% at the end of 1997, dropped to less than 20% 
in mid-1998. In July, the Government successfully conducted the 
privatisation of Telebrás - one of the "crown's precious diamonds" 
of the Brazilian government - and, with the perspective of the 
re-election of President Cardoso - something the market had 
already anticipated -, there was a favourable expectation in the 
economic arena that he, once confirmed in post, would do "some-
thing" - still not defined - to improve the fiscal accounts and the 
country would face a perspective of a gradual improvement in the 
externai account from 1999 on, in an environment of inflation at 
the international levei. 
It was in this context that Russia defaulted its debt, in 
August. Contrary to what happened to Mexico or even Asia, this 
time the market closed almost completely - and for a long time -
to emerging countries, particularly those seen as chronic prob-
lems - and the negative track record of Brazil explains, in part, 
this kind of extreme reaction. 
The effects on Brazil were devastating. In the third quarter 
of 1998 some elementary calculations showed that the country's 
externai account for 1999 simply "did not Glose", generating ali 
types of speculation in the press that, for this reason, Brazil could 
adopt some form of capital flow control. Brazil, however, which 
had a flow problem in 1999 - in the sense that the predicted 
current account deficit would be larger than the capital inflow 
realistically expected started to face a problem of portfolio 
reallocation of economic agents in general, which, be it due to the 
need to recover losses suffered with Russia, the fear of a Brazilian 
externai default or just the perspective of devaluation, promoted 
a massive capital flight. In fact, in the first week of August, right 
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after the financial liquidation of the first payment of Telebrás sale, 
the international reserves had reached almost US$75 billions. In 
only 50 days, however, by the end of September - which was 
labelled the "black September" Brazil lost US$ 30 billions of its 
reserves (Graph 2). 
It was in this context that, a few weeks from presidential 
elections, the Government officially announced that it was nego-
tiating with the IMF an agreement to face this situation based on 
four pillars: i) a strong fiscal adjustment; a tight monetary 
policy - the interest rates increased to approximately 40% again 
in mid September; an externai help package - from the IMF, 
multilateral organisations and G7 countries of US$ 42 billions; 
and iv) the maintenance of the exchange rate policy, an issue then 
still considered a "taboo" by the authorities. 
The announcement of externai aid - despite the fact that 
the details had not been released -, the launch of the first 
adjustment measures, and the confirmation of President Car-
doso's victory in the first round of the elections, let the Govern-
ment finally catch its breath. The country-risk leveis dropped 
again, the interest rates one more time followed a declining path, 
reaching about 30% (Graph 3), and the Government prepared 
itself to receive the promised externai aid. The authorities, despite 
the spoiled credibWty due to the successive traumatic and abrupt 
changes in policy, believed that the story could repeat, with 
interest rates - like after the Mexican and the Asian crises -, 
decreasing and the economy regaining its normal rhythm. The 
proportion of people who believed ali this was pointless and at the 
end Brazil would not manage to avoid a devaluation was un-
doubtedly increasing. Nevertheless, the Government still hoped 
that the situation would gradually improve. 
The coup de grace in the official strategy was given by the 
Graph 2 
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Graph 3 
Nominal Interest Rate - Overnight (%) 
combination of two facts. In December, almost at the same time 
the IMF approved the aid package to Brazil, the Congress rejected 
one of its most important adjustment measures. A few weeks 
later, in the beginning of January 1999, the Government of the 
State of Minas Gerais, which had taken over a few days earlier, 
called for a temporary default of its domestic debt with the 
Federal Government. Even though the fiscal effect of this latter 
measure was practically neutral - because the Federal Govern-
ment had mechanisms to compensate this through the reduc-
tion of the legal transfers it regularly makes to the State -, the 
conjugated impact of both measures was dramatic. On one 
hand, the possibility that Brazil would start receiving resources 
from the IMF and fail to reach the fiscal targets revived the old 
prejudices against the country in the international financial 
markets - the seven letters of intention signed and not hon-
oured in the 80s were insistently quoted. On the other, the 
feticide word "default" was reintroduced in scene in a world 
where the transference of resources from one place to another 
was processed with extreme facility, agility, and in a much more 
intense scale than in the 80s. 
The Government reacted to these circumstances, in the 
beginning of 1999, with the habitual mix of renewing the 
promises of monetary and fiscal austerity. At that point, 
though, scepticism had become dominant. Additionally, the 
very monetary austerity itself created two problems. On one 
hand, operating with interest rates of over 30% with no inflation 
implied increasing in almost one third of the public debt in one 
year, something unconceivable considering it had already in-
creased from 26% to 38% of GDP between 1994 and 1998. On 
the other, since the fiscal targets of the IMF agreement were 
expressed in terms of the expected behaviour of the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR), either the additional 
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interest rates were compensated by equivalent primary adjust-
ments - something virtually impossible given the dimension of 
the rates - or the fiscal targets of the agreement would not be 
honoured in the first quarter of the year. 
In mid-January, then, Brazilian credibility reached very 
low leveis. The economic agents were convinced, day after day, 
that devaluation was inevitable. Drazen and Masson described 
the uselessness of certain "tough messages" when the market 
simply does not believe it to be viable: 
"Our results may be illustrated by a simple story. One afternoon, a 
colleague announces to you that he is serious about losing weight and 
plans to skip dinner. He adds that he has not eaten for two days. Does 
this information make it more or less credible that he really will skip 
dinner? [Some model implies] that with each meal he skips, the 'tough 
policy' of slcipping the next meal becomes more credible, as each obser-
vation of playing tough raises the probability we assign to his being a 
fanatic dieter. Once we realise that his skipping one meal makes him 
hungrier at the next mealtime (i.e., that policy has persistent effects), we 
are led to the opposite conclusion, namely, that it becomes less likely he 
will stick to his diet the more meais he has skipped" (Drazen and Masson 
[1994, p. 736]). 
In the Brazilian case, the idea that the Government was 
losing its autonomy to be abie to decide over the maintenance of 
its currency policy was reinforced by the fact that the original 
agreement with the IMF, signed when the exchange rate was still 
controlled, established that "adjusted net international reserves" 
- defined as gross reserves minus the gross official obligations -
could not be inferior to US$ 20 billions. It is worth mentioning 
that gross reserves were approximately US$ 40 billions when the 
IMF agreement was approved. By definition, the resources from 
externai loans did not affect the concept of net reserves because 
they increased gross reserves but also the obligations. In fact, 
then, the IMF' agreement was limiting the intervention margin of 
the Central Bank with respect to the defence of the currency 
policy. To be straight forward, with this amendment the agreement 
with the IMF became useless. Worse: in fact, it may have stimu-
lated the demand for reserves, once it had undermined the 
manoeuvre capacity of the authorities to react to what was 
configuring as a case of a speculative attack. 
On the first days of January 1999, the reserve loss was 
dramatic. At the end of the controlled exchange rate experience, 
reserve loss was at the rate of US$ 1 bWion a day. On January 
13, the Government announced the substitution of Central 
Banks President and the adoption of a band system, which in 
fact represented a 9% devaluation. This could have been an 
interesting idea in other circumstances but it could not work 
out on those days. As predicted, the reserve loss continued and 
in the first day of the band system the exchange rate reached 
its ceiling. 
Once again we saw the same scrtpt of other currency crises 
where, after the Government "blinked", nobody believed in its 
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promises that the new limit would be respected. The new system 
lasted exactly 48 hours. Finally, due to the absolute lack of 
alternatives, the Central Bank let the currency fluctuate on 
January 15. 4 Brazil experienced, then, an overshooting case 
typical of text books. Before the currency change the rate was at 
R$/US$ 1.21. On January 14 it reached the band's ceiling: 1.32. 
At the end of January it boosted 1,98; 5 and in the beginning of 
March - the peak of devaluation - it got to 2.16. 
Krugman's terminology is well known when he refers to the 
genesis of currency crisis, brought up by the reflection around 
the successive Asian crises of 1997-1998, which did not fit into 
the most popular academic models of the time (Krugman [19981). 
In the "first generation" models (Krugman [1979]), a government 
with successive fiscal deficits tries to maintain a certain currency 
parity that the agents perceive as unsustainable overtime, which 
promotes a speculative attack against the currency. In the "second 
generation" models (Obstfeld 1994]), the propagation mechanism 
of the crisis is different because, even though the exchange rate 
is defendable, currency policy has a cost for the government, 
represented by the interest rate required to win over the confi-
dente of the economic agents regarding the maintenance of the 
policy. The Brazilian externai crisis had a few components of the 
second generation models, where the self-fulfilling prophecies 
play an important role. It was, nevertheless, a somehow classical 
textbook crisis - i.e., of first generation where fiscal and current 
account unbalances, in a rigid exchange rate regime, lead to a 
successive gradual loss of reserves, speculative attack and de-
valuation. The Asian crisis may have caught analysts by surprise 
and left many perplexed. In the Brazilian crisis case, though, it 
was an outcome expected by many of the - increasingly numerous 
- critics and that the Government perfectly knew it could happen 
- not only since the Asian crisis but since the Mexican, in 1995. 
A few weeks later, with the economy in the process of 
normalisation, the dollar would go back down to 1.65. In the 
4 In the words of a Central Bank ex-president, Afonso Celso Pastore, the abandoning of the controlled 
currency policy followed between 1994 and the beginning of 1999, in the circumstances it occurred, 
represented an initial relief similar to that of a puncture. Once rid of the "infection" that was causing 
the true reserve bleeding, it was necessary to treat a long line of measures so that the country could 
overcome the crisis, but on that moment the feeling was that either the previous regime was to be 
abandoned, or the country would be left with no reserves, or still an externai default would become 
inevitable. 
5 On the last day of January, facing the risk of losing control over the inflationary process, with internai 
conflicts within the economic staff and in the midst of conflicts between the Central Bank's President 
and the IMF mission, President Cardoso dismissed the president of the Central Bank, naming Mr. 
Arminio Fraga for the post. Though, for approximately 40 days, Brazil, in the midst of a dramatic 
currency crisis, stood in the bizarre situation of having simultaneously four Central Bank Presidents: 
Gustavo Franco, who left on January 13 but had not formally passed his post onto his successor; 
Francisco Lopes, approved by the Senate but dismissed before the formal ceremony of job transmis-
sion; the Director of the External Area, who became the provisory President: and the new President, 
Arminio Fraga, who could only take over after being approved by the Senate and was only confirmed 
in March. Two leadership changes in the maximum monetary authority in 20 days, lack of a President 
in post and absence of Directors in the Central Bank - the new ones had not even been indicated: 
it is difficult to think of a worse scenario to implement a change in currency regime! 
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overshooting stage of the currency, however, a situation dose to 
panic was installed in respect to what could happen with the 
public debt. 6 The latter closed 1998 at 38% of GDP. Nevertheless, 
the debt affected by devaluation - externai debt and internai debt 
in bonds indexed to the exchange rate -, before it occurred, was 
of approximately 15% of GDP. With the elevated nominal interest 
rates of January and the nominal devaluation of 64% that took 
place between December and January, and before the nominal 
drop of the exchange rate and the price increase that followed this 
change - and that, in fact, inflated GDP -, the public debt in 
January reached 48% of GDP: a 10 point GDP jump in only 30 
days! 
The analysis that debt was followin' g an explosive path and 
the threat of a default of the internai debt brought to life old ghosts 
and the trauma of March 1990, when President Fernando Collor 
blocked a substantial part of the country's financial savings. On 
the last business day of January, specifically, there was a race to 
the banks ali over the country and a generalised rumour - though 
unfounded, as later proved - that the Government would declare 
a bank holiday and President Cardoso would default the internai 
debt, similar to what President Collor had done.' In this context, 
the original agreement with the IMF had turned into dust only a 
month after it has been formally approved by the institution's 
board, in December 1998. 
4. The End of Gradualism: What Happened in 1999? 
In the light of what had happened at the beginning of the 
year, the path followed by the various macroeconomic variables 
in the months following the devaluation was simply unimagin-
able. Nobody could have guessed that, surrounded by the ex-
change rate highs verified until March, the year would end with 
inflation - in terms of consumer prices - below 10% and a slight 
GDP growth. 
The inflexion point was, undoubtedly, the fact that Arminio 
Fraga took office at the Central Bank in March and the decisions 
were made after that. The economic staff, after a few weeks of 
absolute silence, acted in many directions. First, it took the 
decision - which would prove crucial - to, despite the criticisms, 
elevate nominal interest rates again, something essential to avoid 
6 The public debt concept used in this paper refers to the net debt of the consolidated public sector, 
but excludes the monetary base, which is computed as debt in the official statistics. For comparative 
effects, it is important to recall that the monetary base in Brazil has been around 3 to 4% of GDP in 
the last years. 
7 It was on this day, in a picture of complete apathy by the Central Bank, which was also paralysed 
by the impasse of the IMF negotiations, that President Cardoso decided to promote the second change 
in the Central Bank's presidency. 
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that, in the trace of inflation, the real rates became negative, and 
the same mistake that spoiled the previous stabilisation plans 
was made again. Second, it teamed up with political leaders to 
promptly approve the remaining issues of the adjustment. Finally, 
it organised a series of road shows around the world with the 
purpose of reopening the credit fines, whose closure was holding 
back the normalisation of the country's commercial relations. It 
was this package of initiatives that generated an expressive 
nominal appreciation still in March (Graph 4). At the end of the 
year, taking as reference the wholesale price indexes, the real 
devaluation December-December ended up limited to 22% - in 
the case of consumer price index (CPI) indicators, it was substan-
tially higher: exactly the double, 44% (see Graph 5). 
Inflation, if measured by CPI, followed an amazingly mod- 
Graph 4 
Exchange Rate - R$/US$ - End of Period 
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erate trajectory, staying slightly below 9,0% in the January-De-
cember period, which, given the nominal devaluation of 48%, 
implied a pass-through of just 0.19, something that not even the 
most optimistic defender of the devaluation could predict. In only 
four of the 12 months of the year CPI monthly inflation was 
superior to 1% (Graph 6). This, by the way, was partially due to 
the hike in the oil prices in the international market - which 
started the year at approximately US$15/barrel and later reached 
US$30 -, that generated unbearable pressures, leading the Gov-
ernment to implement successive price increases for gasoline and 
other oil derivatives throughout the year. 
In respect to the levei of activity, the majority of foreign 
analysts committed major forecast mistakes with regards to what 
could happen to GDP after the devaluation. There were reasons 
to fear a strong increase in inflation, which ended up not happen-
ing, but the predictions of GDP decrease were clearly exaggerated. 
Some foreign investment banks, in their analysis about Brazil, 
stated with conviction that GDP's fali could reach 6% or 7%, 
similar to what was verified in Mexico and Korea in consequence 
of their respective crises. Three reasons, though, supported the 
hypothesis that this could hardiy occur: 
i) contrary to those countries, Brazil had already experi-
enced recession in the previous year, making it difficult to believe 
in a new and profound decrease in the levei of activity in a scenario 
of already low demand; 
ii) historically, Brazil have had two very grave crises in the 
past 50 years: the externai debt crisis in the beginning of the 
1980s, and the contraction caused by the blociçing of financial 
assets in 1990, in the Collor Plan, when during a whole month 
many sectors simply ceased production, affecting the annual 
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result; nevertheless, in neither of these cases GDP's fali was 
superior to 4%; and 
iii) in Brazil, nothing dose to a financial crisis and its 
typical "domino-effecr happened, as it occurred in both Mexico 
and Korea. 
In any way, due to the decrease in real wages and the highs 
in interest rates observed in the beginning of the year, it was 
reasonable to imagine a drop in GDP. The Government, though, 
in the fear of being considered excessively optimistic - a sin it had 
already committed in the past and that made it lose its credibility 
opted to be conservative and officially assume that GDP would 
drop between 3% and 4% in 1999. 
The observed trajectory, though, was completely different. 
In fact, in seasonally adjusted terms, GDP began to grow still in 
the first quarter of the year in respect to the previous quarter (see 
Graph 7). The reasons for this have been linked to two factors: i) 
a movement towards import substitution in the industry, with the 
increase in production of the sectors where the demand for 
imports fell the most; and the drop in real interest rates. 8 On 
the other hand, the contraction of real wages that was initially 
predicted did not occur in the magnitude expected due to the 
moderate inflation. Consequently, a strong consumption contrac-
tion did not happen. With ali that, GDP ended up having a slightly 
positive growth of around 1%, due basically to the negative carry 
Graph 
Quarterly GDP, Seasonally Adjusted (1990 = 100) 
8 To measure real interest rates in a situation of relative price changes is something always difficult. 
The fact, however, is that, in the end. the nominal overnight rate stayed at 25,6% in 1999, against 
a variation of industrial prices January-December of 28,3%. Therefore, the reality in terms of real 
interest rates turned out to be significantly different from what was initially feared, when prices had 
not yet increased and interest rates were stratospheric. To have an idea of the contrast with the 
previous situation, in 1998 the nominal overnight rate was 28.8% and industrial prices dropped 
0,2%. 
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over inherited by the levei of activity in 1998. If we compare the 
GDP from the last quarter of 1999 with the same quarter of 1998, 
however, there was a growth of 3,6%. In this context, unemploy-
ment remained stable at approximately 7,5% because, although 
employment did not grow, an atypical behaviour of the Economi-
cally Active Population (EAP) - which remained stagnated - 
occurred due to the increase in the number of people who gave 
up the search for jobs. 
In general terms, January 1999 marked the end of the 
gradualist strategy to face the crisis. As stated before, the primary 
result had improved in 1998 in respect to 1997 at the same time 
that the real exchange rate had already been devaluating in real 
terms. The crisis, though, precipitated the facts and obliged the 
Government to speed the double adjustment process - externai 
and fiscal. Besides letting the exchange rate fluctuate, it adopted 
extremely ambitious targets for the public accounts, in the con-
text of the IMF agreement. In the agreement negotiated by the end 
of 1998, before the devaluation, the goal was to achieve a consoli-
dated primary surplus of 2,6%, 2,8% and 3,0% of GDP for the 
years 1999, 2000 and 2001, respectively. When the agreement 
was revised, after the devaluation - which forced a modification 
in parameters two important modifications were made in the 
fiscal side. 
The first was the replacement of the Public Sector Borrow-
ing Requirements (PSBR) by the primary surplus as a perform-
ance criterion to evaluate the agreement. In the final version of 
1998, the primary surplus was included in the calculations that 
generated the agreement, but the formal target was represented 
by the PSBR, which let the agreement too vulnerable in the face 
of an eventual need to tighten monetary policy. Brazil argued - 
reasonably - that, in the context of uncertainty around future 
interest rates that characterised the beginning of 1999, it would 
be dangerous to assume PSBR targets, and it managed to con-
vence the IMF authorities to change the performance criteria. 
The second modification was an increase in the primary 
effort requisites, to 3,10%, 3,25% and 3,35% of GDP in 1999, 
2000 and 2001, respectively (Table 3). The movement was justi-
fied because, with the increase in public debt caused by devalu-
ation, the primary surplus necessary to meet (at the end of the 
three-year program) a certain target of the relationship debt/GDP 
Table 3 
Primary Surplus - IMF Agreement (% GDP) 
1999 2000 2001 
Central Government 2,50 2.65 2,60 
States and Municipalities 0.30 0.50 0.65 
State Companies 0.30 0,10 0.10 
Total 3.10 3,25 3.35 
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would have to be bigger to compensate for the debt increase. For 
a country with such negative fiscal record and with perspectives 
of a fali in per capita income for two consecutive years, going from 
an equilibrium in the primary result to a surplus of 3,1% of GDP 
in only one year was a major chailenge, politically feasible only 
by the "feeling of being a step away from the precipice", which 
dominated the country's leaders in such circumstances. 9 
Contrary to the expectations of the majority of analysts and 
the old Brazilian tradition of not meeting targets accorded with 
the IMF, in 1999 the fiscal target was honoured (Table 4). What 
also contributed to that was inflation, which, despite remaining 
within the limits desired by the Government, "facilitated" some-
how the real fali in expenditure. 
The combination of i) currency appreciation, comparing to 
the overshooting of the beginning of the year; ii) fail in nominal 
interest rates after March; iii) infiation, which ended up making 
real interest rates - that determine the dynamics of the relation-
ship debt/GDP - fali substantially throughout the year in respect 
to 1998; and iv) real growth of the economy during the year, made 
the debt/GDP ratio drop from a maximum of 48% in February to 
43% at the end of the year. 
Table 4 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirements - PSBR (% GDP) 
1998 1999 2000/a 
PSBR /b 7,58 5,57 4,00 
Central Government /b 5,00 2.60 1.55 
States and Municipalities 2,05 3,03 2,50 
State Companies 0,53 -0.06 -0,05 
Primary deficit /c -0,01 -3,08 -3,25 
Central Government /c -0,56 -2,25 -2,65 
Federal Government and BC /c -1,36 -3,17 3,45 
INSS /c 0,80 0,92 0,80 
States and Municipalities /c 0,19 -0.21 -0.30 
State Companies /c 0,36 -0,62 -0,30 
Interests /b 7,59 8,65 7,25 
Central Government /b 5,56 4,85 4,20 
States and Municipalities 1,86 3,24 2,80 
State Companies 0,17 0,56 0,25 
a/ Author's foremst. 
b/ Not including effects of clevaluation. 
c/ (-) = Surplus. 
Source: Central Banlc. 
9 For a description of the historic problems of the Brazilian public sector, see Giambiagi and Além 
[1999]. 
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On the other hand, the main disappointment in 1999 was, 
undoubtedly, the result of the Trade Balance, which once again 
terminated with a deficit. In light of the facts, though, it is not 
difficult to explain what happened. There are fundamentally four 
reasons that explain the result and the contrast with the dimen-
sion of the adjustment by which Mexico and Korea had previously 
gone through due to their respective crises: 
a) the collapse of commodity prices in the international 
market strongly affected Brazil: the average price index of basic 
products fell 15% in respect to 1998 and the semi-manufactured 
goods 17%, causing an expressive drop in the total export index 
(Graph 8); 
b) an important part of Brazilian exports is composed of 
manufactured goods and, among them, there is a certain concen-
tration in Latin American countries. Because in 1999 ali Latin 
America - except Mexico, with whom Brazilian trade is scarce, 
and Peru, a small country - was in recession, manufacture 
exports to the region suffered a substantial reduction, affecting 
the country's total sales; 
c) instead of suffering a big fali as many had initially 
predicted and as happened in Mexico and Korea, Brazil's GDP 
grew around 1% in 1999, meaning that a contraction of aggregate 
demand did not happen in the economy; and 
d) oil prices had an increase comparable to the 1973 and 
1979 shocks, harming the country, since it imports around one 
third of the oil consumed. 
In this context, the export quantum experienced a progres-
sive improvement after devaluation and a time lag, as it was 
expected (Graph 9). The still high demand for imports and the fali 
Graph 8 
Exports Prices Index - Average 1996 = 100 
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in prices, however, impeded a more accentuated improvement in 
the frade balance. In the year's balance, exports fell 6% and 
imports 15%, but the country finished 1999 with a trade deficit 
of approximately US$ 1 billion - way below the US$ 7 billions in 
1998, though. 
The current account, m turn, experienced an important 
improvement. Besides the drop in the trade deficit, the currency 
devaluation had a positive impact on the other two important 
rubrics of the current account: the transportation account - 
linked to the trade movement - and especially the travel account 
- travelling abroad became very expensive! At the same time, 
after devaluation, the heavy profits and dividends remittances 
of 1998 - obviously stimulated by the fear of an exchange rate 
change - did not reoccur. Together, these two factors decreased 
the current account deficit from US$ 34 billions in 1998 to US$ 
24 billions in 1999. This did not translate into an improvement 
in the same scale of the indicator current account deficit/GDP, 
by the simple fact that the devaluation decreased the GDP value 
in dollars. However, it will probably allow a drop in this indicator 
if, as expected, with the economy growth - and even if the real 
exchange rate remains unchanged -, GDP's value increases in the 
future. 
Following the fiscal improvement and the perception that 
the change in the externai situation, despite its tardiness, was 
beginning to occur, investors were gaining more confidence in the 
future perspectives of the economy. Then the country-risk, meas-
ured by the spread of the of the 30-year Par Bonds, in basis points, 
over the US treasury bond of similar characteristics, which had 
Graph 9 
Exports Manufactured Goods - Quantum Index - Moving 
Average 12 Months (1996 = 100) 
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Source: JP Morgan. Par bonda basis points over USA T-Bonds (30 years). 
Graph 10 
Country-risk (Balis Points) 
passed the 2300 points in the crucial moments in January 1999, 
started to descend (Graph 101.  
5. From the Deficit of Targets to the Deficit Targets: 
a New Economic Policy Regime (Temporary or 
Permanent?) 
In the years of fiscal deterioration, in more than one 
opportunity and coming from more than one analyst, it appeared 
in the economic debate the proposal that the Government should 
commit itself to fiscal targets; i.e., ceilings in the "Maastricht 
style", which would limit governmental action and control the 
evolution of public debt. In fact, though, such proposals lacked 
purpose and the Government did not adopt them. Instead of 
deficit targets, Brazil experienced a deficit of targets... 
In 1999, in the context of the IMF agreement, the situation 
changed completely and the Government was led to adopt afiscal 
rule correspondent to a behavioural principie, in the form of a 
variant of the defmition of Kopits and Symansky: "A fiscal policy 
rule may consist of a limit on, or a target for, the stock of public 
debt as a proportion of GDP" (Kopits and Symansky [1998, p. 26]). 
Even though the difficulty in guessing with certain precision the 
future behaviour of interest rates had led Brazil to adopt a primary 
surplus target instead of a nominal deficit target. In fact - and as 
long as interest did not exceed the premises of the exercise that 
served as basis for the calculation of the primary effort require-
ment - the objective was to redirect the trajectory of public debt. 
The idea was to "substantially reduce the proportion between 
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public debt and GDP" throughout 1999 - after the highs associ-
ated with the devaluation - and continue with this trend in 2000 
and 2001, as stated in the memorandum of economic policy of 
the agreement approved by the IMF board in March 1999, after 
the revision of the original 1998 accord. 
The economic policy regime adopted in 1999 was based on 
four pillars: 
a) fiscal austerity, in the form of strict targets of primary 
results for the three-year period 1999-2001; 
b) approval of the so-called "reforms"; 
c) adoption of inflation targets; 1° 
d) free-floating exchange rate. 
The targets established in the IMF agreement have been 
mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, it is worth comparing these 
targets with the surplus that would be required, ceteris paribus, 
to maintain debt stable at 45% of GDP, with a seignorage of 0,2% 
of GDP. In a relative normal situation - inflation at 2%, nominal 
interest rates at 10% to 12% and real economic growth of 4% to 
5% -, the public sector would need to generate a primary surplus 
of 1,0% to 2,3% of GDP (Table 5). It is important to recall that, in 
the 1999-2001 period, interest rate has been standing above 
these numbers and growth below them. This is why primary 
surplus has to be so expressive. In the future, with lower interest 
rates and the perspective of a higher growth, the required primary 
surplus could be lowered to the leveis mentioned above. 
Focusing on the remaining elements, in 1999, the Govern-
ment tried to create the basis for a permanent change in the 
country's fiscal situation. Two measures were relevant in this 
Table 5 
Primary Surplus Required to Stabilize Debt at 45% of GDP 
(% GDP) 
Seignorage = 0,2% GDP 
Inflation = 2 % 
Nominal gross 
interest raie (%) 
GDP real growth rate (%) 
3,0 4,0 5,0 6,0 
8,0 1.06 0,61 0,18 -0,25 
10,0 1.92 1.46 1,02 0,58 
12,0 2,77 2,31 1,86 1,41 
14,0 3,63 3.16 2.70 2,25 
16.0 4,49 4,01 3,54 3,08 
10 See Mishkin [1999] for the logic to adopt an inflation target regime. 
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respect. The first was the approval of new roles for retirement, 
limiting the income of those who retire too early. Even though 
early retirements are still possible, whoever has an early retire-
ment will have a low pension ceiling, which will increase as the 
individual postpones the retirement. This has improved the pers-
pectives of the Social Security account in the next years. The 
second measure was the proposal of a Constitutional Amendment 
- to be discussed during the year 2000 - freeing until 2006 part 
of the earmarked resources, which leaves considerable room for 
Government to cut down public expenditure. 
With regards to inflation targets, since 1999 Brazil became 
a member of a group of approximately 10 countries that, like New 
Zealand, England and Canada, adopted this system. The authori-
ties defined an inflation target of 8% for 1999, 6% for 2000 and 
4% for 2001, with a 2 percentage point margin tolerance. In the 
first year, inflation (CPI) stayed at 8,9%, within the accorded 
interval, and for 2000 the expectations stand around 6% or 7%. 
With this, the Government committed itself, formally and explic-
itly, to the goal of reaching price stability, something that repre-
sents a new experience for Brazil. If these targets are met, bringing 
national inflation to international leveis (2,0% to 2,5%) in 2003 
or 2004, such fact will certainly shape the behaviour of future 
Governments because it would represent a true cultural revolution 
in the Brazilian context, where part of the political leadership, in 
the past, were always willing to allow "a little more" inflation in 
exchange for growth. 
The free exchange rate, finally, completes the array of the 
economic policy tools available. In the controlled exchange rate 
regime, the nominal devaluation of 7% to 8% a year, in a context 
of practically no inflation, represented a source of pressure on 
domestic interest rates, which, despite not being particularly 
attractive when measured in dollars, were extremely high when 
adjusted by a domestic price index. With the devaluation and the 
floating exchange rate, the monetary authority gained degrees of 
freedom. Therefore, the rates, in real terms, fell significantly in 
1999, reflecting these new circumstances. 
The remaining doubts regarding the Brazilian economic 
policy regime rely on its sustainability overtime. Even though the 
adjustment effort is evident, a substantial part of the surplus has 
been obtained through temporary and emergency measures to 
raise revenue and/or cost cuts (Table 6). The most significant 
example is the Provisory Contribution over Financial Transac-
tions (Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentações Financeiras - 
CPMF), which is expected to collect, in 2000, more than 1,5% of 
GDP, but should be extinct in June 2002. 
The Government's challenge from now on - and this is valid 
not only for the current but for the next Government, which will 
take over in 2003 and will not count on the presently available 
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Table 6 
Extraordinary Factors of Fiscal Adjustment (% GDP) 
Cornposition 1998 1999 2000 
CPMF 0,9 0,9 1,6 
Concession Revenues 1,0 1,0 0,5 
Additional Income Tax 0,1 0,1 0,1 
Income Tax: Financial Assets 0,3 0,0 0,0 
Elimination of Deductions (Cofins) 0,0 0,3 0,3 
FEF/DRU 0,3 0,3 0,1 
Debt Payments 0,0 0,6 0,0 
Total 2,6 3,2 2,6 
revenue sources - is to preserve the adjustment effort, even if with 
a less ambitious primary target. However, this will have to take 
place i) without the aid of these temporary sources of adjustment, 
and without the "umbrella" of the IMF, now converted into a 
comfortable scapegoat for the authorities. 
6. Why Did Brazil Not Have a Financial Crisis?il 
Up to this point, we have analysed the evolution of the 
Brazilian crisis and compared it with some of the other crises that 
occurred in the second half of the 1990s. As mentioned earlier, 
even though Brazil suffered a traumatic currency devaluation in 
1999 - despite its relatively positive aftermath it did not 
experience a financial crisis per se, such as the Asian countries 
did. But why did a financial crisis not happen in Brazil? What 
differentiated Brazil's financial system from Asia's? 
An important characteristic of the Brazilian financial sys-
tem that distinguishes it, for example, from the Asian case, is its 
low levei of financial depth. In 1996, for instance, private sector 
total credit to GDP in Brazil accounted for 31%, much lower than 
the numbers higher than 100% of GDP of several Asian countries 
(see figures on page 12). These numbers indicate that Brazil, when 
compared to the Asian countries, had a much less vulnerable 
financial system, providing more stability and confidence to the 
market and lessening the chances of a "domino effect" breakdown 
in the system due to a possible series of defaults, such as 
happened in Asia due to the high leverage leveis. 
11 Most data presented in this section - unless otherwise stated - was extracted from Puga [1999] and 
the Central Bank of Brazil. 
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After the Real Plan (1994), many changes took place in the 
Brazilian financial system due, most importantly, to the banks' 
significant loss in revenues linked to the end of inflationary 
transfers, i.e., the floating. At that time, many financial institu-
tions significantly expanded their credit lines - favoured by the 
economic growth that followed stabilisation increased their 
leverage and exposure. Later, with the impact of the Mexican 
crisis in 1995, there was a significant increase in non-performing 
loans. This was in part due to interest rate increases - which also 
had a direct negative impact on the banks' profits - and the drop 
in the levei of activity. Many banks did not resist and went 
bankrupt. 
This financial crisis took place in 1995 and forced the 
Brazilian Government to take action in order to overcome the 
turmoil and strengthen the financial system, under the Basle 
standards. These changes became of vital importance later, in 
1999, inkeeping the currency crisisfrom building up into afinancial 
crisis. The adjustment was made mainly through a series of 
legislation changes, such as: 
- the establishment of minimal capital requirements for 
the constitution of a bank; 
- the establishment of a minimum levei for the financial 
institutions' adjusted net worth of 11% of their risk-
weighted assets (it started at 8% and jumped to 10% 
before reaching the final level); 12 
- fiscal incentives for the incorporation of financial insti-
tutions; 
- more power to the Central Bank in order to allow it to 
take preventive actions to strengthen the financial sys-
tem; 
- the obligation of banks which depend on or have the 
ownership participation of international financial 
institutions to operate within accorded operational 
limits; 
- the allowance of financial institutions to charge for a 
range of services, many of them free of charge in times 
of high inflation; 
- the obligation of financial institutions to identify and 
inform the Central Bank about ali clients with a 
granted credit of above R$ 50 thousand, for safety 
reasons; 
12 The 11% ratio is even more conservative than the Basle requirements. 
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- the obligation of financial institutions to present the 
Central Bank with a program of internai system control, 
according to the Basle Committee; 
- the creation of the Proer program, with the goal of 
securing the liquidity and solvency of the system; 
and 
- the creation of the Proes program, with the goal of 
strengthening the public financial system at the state 
levei. 
One of the most important steps taken by the Brazilian 
government in restructuring its financial system was the effort 
towards mergers, acquisitions, incorporations and transfer of 
ownership control, intensified with the Proer program, instituted 
in November 1995. The program consisted in creating a special 
line of financial assistance for the administrative, operational and 
ownership reorganisation of financial institutions. This process 
deepened in the following years and concentration in the bank 
industry increased as a consequence. In December 1994, the ten 
largest banks in the country accounted for 63% of the system's 
total assets and the twenty largest for 76%, while in December 
1998, these numbers went up to 68% and 81%, respectively. 
Another tendency was the increase in participation of privately 
owned institutions in the banking system, which grew from 49% 
in December 1994 to 54% in December 1998. These two trends 
have been playing an important role in making the system more 
solid and reliable. 
Another major move in Brazil's transforming financial 
system was the implementation of the Proes program, in August 
1996. The plan consisted in either privatising, liquidating or 
changing the role of public state -levei banks. At the beginning of 
the program, the public state financial system was composed of 
35 institutions and by the end of all processes it is expected that 
just about nine state levei banks will remain. So far, from the 26 
institutions which have entered the program, 10 were privatised, 
5 were extinct and 11 became foment agencies. The highlight of 
the program was probably the acquisition of the Banerj (the Bank 
of Rio de Janeiro) by the Banco Itaú, the second largest private 
bank in the country. The Proes played a major role in making the 
system more solid and healthy, decreasing the leverage ratio of 
multiple and commercial state-levei banks (credits/net assets) -
from 15% in June to 9% in December 1996 -, and increasing the 
share of provisions in respect to delayed credits and credits in 
liquidation. 
The increasing participation of foreign banks in the Bra-
zilian scene is also a phenomenon that contributed to the coun-
try's financial system improvement. The number of foreign banks 
in Brazil, from June 1995 to December 1998, increased from 37 
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to 52 (the number of foreign controlled national banks grew from 
20 to 36) increasing the participation of foreign banks in the total 
number of universal and commercial banks from 15% to 26% in 
the period. If we take into account foreign banks' subsidiaries and 
banks with foreign control, international institutions owned 21% 
of multiple and commercial banks' total assets by the end of 1998 
against 12% in June 1994, and banks with foreign share in-
creased from 6% to 10% in the same period. In this context, an 
important step was taken when the Banco Real joined forces with 
the ABN Amro Bank, becoming Brazil's fourth largest private 
financial group. 13 The importance of foreign participation in the 
financial system is especially related to improvements in the 
quality of services, technology transfer, spread reduction (even 
though better results are still expected on this matter), opera-
tional efficiency, their better capacity to absorb macroeconomic 
turbulence and more facility to protect the system from exchange 
rate volatility (hedge). 14 
The technological upgrade of the Brazilian Bank Industry 
carne with the constant need of change and adjustment linked to 
the turbulent macroeconomic conditions of the past, with the 
reforms mentioned above and the input of foreign know-how, 
strengthening the financial system even further. As put by Stan-
dard & Poor's [1999], "the need to process transactions in different 
local currency denominations... and /or refer to a diverse set of 
multiple indexes, including inflation rates during the hyperinfla-
tionary era, forced banks to constantly upgrade their systems" (p. 
8). Financial institutions in Brazil have strongly invested in 
technology not only to improve the processing, payments and 
telecommunications areas, but also to develop alternative dis-
tribution channels. Technology in the Brazilian financial system 
is of the highest international standards and proofs of this were 
the highly successful Y2K transition, the advanced services 
provided by banks and brokers online (through the Internet), the 
high automation levei of the São Paulo stock exchange, and so 
forth. 
Ali factors mentioned above prevented Brazil from sinking 
into a financial crisis after the devaluation of 1999. Brazil's 
financial system is probably the most solid in Latin America 
because of its diversion, the presence of strong international 
players, its good automation, capitalisation levei and its fairly low 
leverage ratios: all this backed up by the relatively stable eco- 
13 Some of the other major international players in the Brazilian financial system are the BankBoston, 
HSBC Bank, Citibank„ Creditanstalt, Santander, Bilbao Vizcaya, Lloyds, Chase Manhattan and JP 
Morgan. 
14 By the end of 1998, the bank system's externai obligations for multiple and commercial banks 
reached US$ 50.3 billions. Nevertheless, only 28.7% corresponded to national private banks 
obligations while 40.3% belonged to foreign banks, which have more facility to honour these debts 
because they can always count on their headquarters overseas, therefore lessening their vulnerability 
to volatility. 
32 	 Texto para Discussão n2 77 
nomic environment established by the Real plan. To sum up, the 
main reasons for the system's current good shape are: 
- the corrective actions taken after the 1995 crisis, includ-
ing the Proer and Proes programs. 
- the increase of foreign participation in the national 
financial system. 
- the low leveis of financial depth and non-perfon -ning 
loans. 
- the increase in efficiency brought, among other things, 
by technology improvements and competition. 
7. Conclusions 
Contrary to Argentina, where the defence of a nominal 
peso/dollar parity has been the common denominator among the 
immense majority of economists, in the Brazilian case, the con-
sensus among economists in the country after the Asian crisis 
was that the exchange rate should be devaluated. The controversy 
regarded the speed of the process. The government - and those 
who support its policy - argued that, as long as the rate of nominal 
devaluation remained constant - or even declined gradually -, in 
a context of virtually no inflation, currency appreciation would 
disappear. The critics, on the other hand, were in favour of a 
discontinuity. 
The official line of argumentation before the devaluation 
can be summarised by the following words of one of the authors 
of this paper: "Brazil,..., in contrast with England in 1992, is not 
committed to a fixed exchange rate but a policy of gradual - yet 
intense - real devaluation of its exchange rate, which has been 
depreciating at a rate of 7% to 8% a year in a context of inflation 
dose to zero. [Then], as time passes by, exchange rate will become 
closer to [the] 'ideal' point" (Giambiagi [1999]). 
The strategy had two drawbacks. First, it was based on the 
premise that the rest of the world would continue to finance the 
country, what actually turned out to be wrong. Second, the 
internai cost of this policy, represented by the effect that the 
announced gradual real devaluation implied over the interest 
rates, pressuring public debt and limiting the growth potential of 
the country. On the other hand, the benefit claimed over the 
maintenance of the policy was obvious: to preserve stabilisation, 
which the Government thought that could be threatened by the 
discontinuity of the exchange rate policy. 
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It is worth registering that, rhetoric aside, the fear towards 
the inflationary effects of an eventual devaluation was not exclu-
sive to the defenders of the policy. As sincerely stated by one of 
the most notorious critics of the policy followed until January 
1999 - in light of the amazingly low inflation of 1999 -, "even the 
economists who were more optimistic regarding the realisation of 
a currency devaluation without the destruction of the stabilisa-
tion program, among them myself, none could have predicted 
such a combination of nominal exchange rate and inflation for 
1999" (Batista Jr. [1999]). 
To understand why, after devaluation, armual inflation 
(CPI) was over 50% in Mexico and less than 10% in Brazil, despite 
the fact that GDP in Mexico suffered a historic fali and Brazil's a 
modest growth, will certainly be a theme for research in the 
Brazilian academic environment for the next few years. Some 
lines of thought, however, provide a few clues to what could be 
the correct interpretation of the facts. 
Firstly, Brazil did not suffer a complete erosion in its 
international reserves. Currency fluctuation in Mexico was de-
cided when it was impossible to have another alternative and the 
Central Bank did not have any room for manoeuvring. In Brazil, 
fluctuation was also the only way out, but at that time the country 
still had around US$ 40 billions in reserves, which represented a 
certain power to switch directions in the case of an overshooting. 
This power was actually used, without exaggeration but with 
favourable results, in certain critical moments. 
Secondly, even though GDP had grown in Brazil in 1999, 
devaluation met the country in the middle of a "valley" on its levei 
of activity. 15 Nevertheless, at the time of devaluation, the condi-
tions to practice a generalised exchange rate passthrough were 
much worse for companies than at the time of the Mexican or 
Korean cases, who were going through a growth stage. 
Thirdly, monetary policy played a preponderant role in 
disarming inflationary expectations after devaluation. Although 
it had proven useless in avoiding externai crisis, the opportunity 
cost of continuing with speculation became too high once devalu-
ation had occurred, and the fact that the Central Bank elevated 
nominal interest rates to 45% when all political pressures pushed 
to the opposite direction, represented a clear indication that the 
"anti-inflationary philosophy" that had marked Central Bank's 
behaviour in the previous years still stood. 
15 In December 1998, immediately before devaluation, the industry levei of monthly production 
seasonably adjusted, according to IBGE data, reached the minimum of the 1997-1998 period, staying 
8% below the maximum levei before the Asian crisis of 1997 and 6% below the maximum levei 
registered after the recovering from the Asian crisis and before the Russian crisis. In order to have 
an idea of the intensity of the recessive process that preceded devaluation in Brazil, it is worth 
recalling that this same levei in December 1998 was 9% below the "peak" of December 1994 - four 
years before! at the very boom of the Real plan, and has never been reached again until the year 
2000. 
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Fourthly, despite all fears in contrary that existed before 
devaluation, the "desindexation" of the economy turned out to be 
more advanced in Brazil than in Mexico. The decision to announce 
a nominal adjustment of the minimum wage of less than 5% in 
April, to start in May, still in the period of relative price turmoil 
associated with devaluation, was also a decisive issue in the 
maintenance of stability - in this case, represented by sustain-
ability of annual inflation below one digit. 
Lastly, even though the decision was announced when the 
panic had already been attenuated, the announcement of the 
inflation target regime, made in June, was another sign in favour 
of the expectations of the economic agents regarding a relatively 
well-behaved inflation. 
The fact, though, is that devaluation seems to have been 
relatively "cheap" for BraziL In other words, the Government 
firmly resisted to the devaluation pressures during many years 
because of the assumption that the inflationary repercussion of 
changing currency policy would be too elevated. After more than 
one year of the devaluation, with the country resuming growth 
and inflation staying below two digits and having taken a path of 
clear decline again - measured by the 12-month indicator -, it is 
valid to recognise that the cost of devaluation was actually low in 
Brazil. 
It seems that there is no way to make a balanced analysis 
of the role of the IMF in the success of the economic policy without 
concluding that, in general terms, the IMF agreement and the 
economic policy that followed it were actually good for Brazil. The 
"liquidity mattress" represented by the US$ 42 billion loan per-
mitted Brazil to overcome dramatic circumstances; interest rates 
were elevated in the right moment and reduced in the right speed 
and intensity during 1999; the severe fiscal measures taken 
radically changed the economic context of the country - tradition-
ally seen as reckless in fiscal matters; inflation did not increase 
substantially; and the country resumed growth, in seasonably 
adjusted terms, right after devaluation - even though the negative 
carry over inherited from 1998 kept this growth from being better 
in 1999. 
On the other hand, the IMF also committed mistakes in 
the case of Brazil. Three of them were important at the time. The 
first was the clause with the reserve requirement established in 
the first agreement which, as we stressed, limited the room of 
authorities for initiatives in defence of the original parity before 
devaluation. Even though one might understand that it was 
difficult to lend US$ 42 billions to a country with a negative 
background such as Brazil, objectively this limitation ended up 
contributing to the speculations against the continuity of the 
currency policy practiced until January 1999. 
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IMF's second mistake was having contributed to the pa-
ralysis that took over the authorities in the first weeks of the crisis, 
after devaluation. Regardless of eventual divergences that may 
have existed between the former Central Bank President and the 
Finance Minister, and the difficulty to implement a stabilisation 
program without having voted the fiscal measures of the adjust-
ment, it seems that having stayed passively watching the daily 
increase of the dollar (in average, of more than 4,5% per business 
day between January 14 and 29) was a mistake, to which IMF's 
delay to re-establish the negotiations with the country also con-
tributed. 
Having let the dollar reach R$ 2.00 again in the second half 
of 1999 - without revising the allowance to spend part of the 
reserves in the currency market - after having dropped to R$ 1.65 
following the initial overshooting was the third mistake, which 
explains in part the spasmodic inflation increase in the end of 
1999. At the time, authorities hid themselves under the old saying 
that "with a fluctuating exchange rate regime, the exchange rate 
fluctuates", when actually, as well stated by professor Ilan Gold-
fajn from PUC, Rio de Janeiro, for a country like Brazil, "a 
fluctuating exchange rate is good when it does not fluctuate". It 
was obvious that a new round of dollar appreciation would trigger 
a new series of price increases and that economic authorities 
would like to avoid this. However, they found themselves with 
their hands tied because the terms of the intervention margin in 
the currency market had not been negotiated with the IMF yet. A 
better acceptance by the IMF of these rule changes - giving more 
power of manoeuvring to the Central Bank - would have been 
desirable. A prove of this is that the only announcement of the 
terms of this new agreement contributed to "break" the dollar's 
quotation, which closed at R$ 1.79 at the end of the year. 
Aside from these topic reflections, one relevant issue that 
is inserted in the future agenda of the country is the exchange 
rate regime that should be the "permanent" one in Brazil. The 
experience of controlled exchange rate traumatised the country 
in a certain way. On the other hand, as Paul Volcker reminded 
the Brazilians in one of his visits to the country in 1999, "pure 
free exchange rate is something for just two or three countries in 
the world" and, as already stated in this paper, this "purity" led 
to a high inflation in the second half of 1999 for not having halted 
the merely speculative demand pressure for dollars. 
If the Brazilian experience with a (almost) fixed exchange 
rate was negative and if pure fluctuation also brought problems, 
what type of regime should be targeted for the future as a form to 
minimise the drawbacks associated to these two types of extreme 
regimes? This is an incipient debate in Brazil, but which will 
probably intensify in the next months or years and could lead to 
the adoption of some type of regime similar to Mexico's, with daily 
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forms of intervention by the authorities with the goal of reducing 
volatility. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting over the potentialities of the 
Brazilian economy and the long term effects of the modernisation 
which the Brazilian enterprises went through in the past 10 years 
(Franco [1.999b]; Moreira [1999]). Despite the different economic 
policies applied in the period, there is a common denominator in 
the evolution of the Brazilian economy since 1990: the adoption 
of policies vaguely denominated "market friendly" and the mod-
ernisation of Brazilian companies. In the first half of the decade 
this was dimmed, however, by truly impressive leveis of inflation 
- the price variation rate in 12 months, measured by the General 
Price Index of Fundação Getulio Vargas, was 5154%, when the 
Real Plan was adopted in June 1994. In the following years, 
inflation dropped drastically but public debt increased and the 
externai deficit - which practically clid not exist in 1994 - became 
a major problem. In 1999, measures were taken in order to correct 
these two unbalances but inflation increased and income per 
capita dropped once again. 
From 2000 on, though, Brazil has ali the conditions to 
initiate an expansion cycle such as it has not had since the 1970s, 
even though circumstances point to lower rates. The two unbal-
ances - fiscal and externai - mentioned above are starting to fade 
out, inflation is going down again and in the officiol scenario the 
combination of a lower country-risk and decreasing domestic 
interest rates can stimulate growth, improve revenues, deepen 
the fiscal adjustment, provide new drops in the risk indicators 
and generate a virtuous cycle of growth and reduction of risk 
premium. 
In this case, the permanence of an expressive inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) could gradually reduce the exter-
nai vulnerability of the country. The evolution of FDI flow is one 
of the most impressive transformations observed in the Brazilian 
economy in the last 5 years. Even without counting the portfolio 
inflows and discounting the Brazilian investment outflows, FDI's 
net inflow in the country, which had been in average around US$ 
1 billion a year for the 1980-1994 period, went up to US$ 3 billions 
in. 1995, US$ 10 billions in 1996, US$ 16 billions in 1997, US$ 
23 billions in 1998, and US$ 28 billions in 1999. The perspective 
is that the continuity of a net inflow of externai long-term re-
sources of around 3% of GDP would fmance most of the current 
account deficit and, also, would allow for a drop in the indicators 
of Net External Debt/Exports and Net External Debt/GDP. Even 
though the amplified externai debt - which includes the foreign 
capital stock in the country - may not vary substantially, its 
composition change, with the change of externai debt for long-
term investment, would make the country less vulnerable to the 
abrupt fluctuations in the international fmance scenario. With 
inflation - if Government intentions prevail - going back to 
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Appendix 
Brazil: Economic Indicators 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000/a 
GDP (US$ billion) /b 429,7 543,1 705,5 775,8 801,6 775,7 556,8 635 
GDP Growth (%) 4,9 5,9 4,2 2,7 3,6 -0,1 1,0 3,5 
Investment (% GDP, 1980 constant prices) 14.4 15,3 16,7 16,5 18,4 18,0 17,0 17,5 
Investment (% GDP, 1990 constant prices) 18,5 20,0 20,6 20,3 21.5 21,3 19,0 19,6 
GDP Deflator (%) 1996,2 2240,2 77,6 17,4 7.1 4,3 11,3 11,0 
Real Interest Rate (%) /c 7,1 24,4 33,1 16,6 16,4 26,5 4,7 10.5 
Unemployment - IBGE (%) 5,3 5,1 4,6 5,4 5,7 7,6 7,6 7,8 
Current Account Deficit (% GDP) 0,1 0,2 2,5 3,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,0 
National Accounts (% GDP, current prices) 
Final Consumption 77,8 77,5 79.5 81,0 80.9 81,4 n.a. n.a. 
Private 60,1 59,6 59,9 62,5 63,1 63,6 n.a. n.a. 
Government 17,7 17,9 19,6 18,5 17,9 17,8 n.a. n.a. 
Gross Capital Formation 20,9 22,2 22,3 20,9 21,7 21,3 n.a. n.a. 
Investment 19.3 20,8 20,5 19.3 19,9 19,9 n.a. n.a. 
Change of Inventories 1,6 1,4 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,4 n.a. n.a. 
Goods and Non-factors Services 1,4 0,4 -1,8 -1,9 -2,6 -2,7 n.a. n.a. 
Exports 10,5 9,5 7,7 7,0 7,6 7,4 n.a. n.a. 
Imports 9,1 9,2 9,5 8,9 10,2 10,1 n.a. n.a. 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 n.a. n.a. 
/a Author's forecast. 
/b GDP divided by the average exchange rate (RS/USS). 
/c Gross rate (SELIC). De, lator: "Centered IGP". 
ma. = not available. 
Sources: IBGE and IPEA. 
international leveis, public debt resuming a declining trajectory 
- as a percentage of GDP, current account deficit controlled in 
approximately 3% of GDP, and in a scenario of no major crises in 
the international scene - which is the "big if'-, the country would 
gather the conditions to stand out in the performance expected 
for the emerging economies in the next years. 
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